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How to Design NTFS Permissions with AGDLP Groups Print

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Applies to: Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022 and Windows Server 2025, subject to the workload and edition requirements below.

Translate business roles into resource permissions

AGDLP means Accounts, Global groups, Domain Local groups and Permissions. User accounts belong to Global role groups; those groups are nested in Domain Local resource groups; the resource groups appear on the folder ACL. The extra layer is intentional. A job change is handled through role membership, while a resource owner can review one clear list of groups that receive read or modify access to a particular directory.

For example, GG-Finance-Analysts represents a business role, while DL-Finance-Modify represents a permission on a resource. The same analysts might need read access to a different share without changing the Finance folder ACL. This guide uses a single-domain example on an NTFS data volume. A forest with multiple account domains may use universal groups and an AGUDLP design; do not force cross-domain nesting into a single-domain example without checking group-scope rules.

Define rights and inheritance before creating groups

Ask the data owner to distinguish reading documents, editing and deleting documents, and administering access. Modify is more than writing: it permits common deletion operations. Full Control includes permission-management capabilities that most business users do not need. Identify any child folders that require distinct access and choose a small number of intentional inheritance boundaries rather than exceptions on individual files.

Make an access matrix with the folder, business role, resource group, rights and approving owner. Include service identities, backup software requirements and administrators. Avoid using Domain Admins for routine file maintenance merely because the group already exists. Keep a controlled recovery path for SYSTEM and an authorized file-administration group, and ensure its membership is reviewed as carefully as business access.

On an existing tree, inventory explicit Deny entries, disabled inheritance and orphaned SIDs before changing anything. Record ownership separately: an ACL export is not a complete substitute for a data backup, and restoring a DACL does not necessarily restore every aspect of security metadata.

Create and nest the groups

Run AD administration commands from a system with the ActiveDirectory module and delegated group-management permissions. The following illustrates new groups in an existing approved OU. Replace the distinguished name and role names with your directory structure. Confirm that the group names are unused before creation; an existing name may have a different purpose.

Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$ou = 'OU=File Access,OU=Groups,DC=corp,DC=example'
New-ADGroup -Name 'GG-Finance-Analysts' -GroupScope Global -GroupCategory Security -Path $ou
New-ADGroup -Name 'DL-Finance-Read' -GroupScope DomainLocal -GroupCategory Security -Path $ou
New-ADGroup -Name 'DL-Finance-Modify' -GroupScope DomainLocal -GroupCategory Security -Path $ou
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity 'DL-Finance-Modify' -Members 'GG-Finance-Analysts'

Populate the Global role group with specifically approved accounts through your normal joiner and role-change process. Do not add all Domain Users as a temporary measure. Record the nesting direction: putting the resource group inside the role group reverses the model and does not achieve the intended effective access. Security-enabled groups are required; a distribution-only group cannot grant NTFS access.

Export the current ACL and establish a safe boundary

For an existing Finance directory, save the ACL relative to a known parent path and preserve the export outside the folder being changed. The working-directory choice matters when restoring. Test the backup and restore method on representative test data first. Check the summary and errors; an export with skipped directories is not a complete safety net.

New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path 'C:\AdminEvidence' -Force | Out-Null
Push-Location 'D:\Shares'
icacls '.\Finance' /save 'C:\AdminEvidence\Finance-acl.txt' /t /c
Pop-Location
Get-Acl 'D:\Shares\Finance' | Format-List Owner,AccessToString

On a new empty folder, remove inherited entries only after confirming that explicit administration and system access will be in place. On an established folder, converting inheritance to explicit entries can preserve access while you assess it, but it also preserves entries you may eventually need to remove. Neither conversion nor removal should be treated as a universal cleanup command. Keep console or alternate administrative access available.

Apply the resource groups to NTFS

The example below applies to a new, reviewed Finance folder. The system and administrators receive Full Control. The read group receives read and execute, and the modify group receives Modify. OI and CI propagate the entries to files and child directories that inherit them. These commands do not recursively reset all existing explicit ACLs.

$path = 'D:\Shares\Finance'
icacls $path /grant:r '*S-1-5-18:(OI)(CI)F' '*S-1-5-32-544:(OI)(CI)F'
icacls $path /inheritance:r
icacls $path /grant:r 'CORP\DL-Finance-Read:(OI)(CI)RX' 'CORP\DL-Finance-Modify:(OI)(CI)M'
icacls $path

Check each command’s exit code and final ACL before proceeding. The /grant:r switch replaces explicit grants for the named trustee; it does not remove every other trustee. Therefore a successful command does not prove that broad old access has disappeared. Inspect and remove obsolete entries individually after the owner approves them. Avoid /reset /t on a business tree unless the resulting inheritance model has been deliberately reviewed.

Validate nesting and effective access

Review both direct membership and the recursive account view. Direct membership shows whether the AGDLP structure is understandable; recursive membership helps confirm which users ultimately enter a resource group. Neither view proves the user’s current logon token contains a recent change. Sign out and back in, or use an isolated fresh test session, before assessing newly assigned membership.

Get-ADGroupMember 'DL-Finance-Modify'
Get-ADGroupMember 'DL-Finance-Modify' -Recursive
icacls 'D:\Shares\Finance'

Test a reader, modifier and unrelated account against the real UNC path. Readers should open but not edit or delete test files. Modifiers should perform the approved create, edit, rename and delete workflow. An unrelated account should be denied. Test sensitive subfolders separately because disabled inheritance or direct user entries can produce different results. If the share layer grants only Read, correct NTFS Modify permissions still will not allow network writes.

Diagnose unexpected access without adding broad grants

When access is unexpectedly denied, identify the exact file and actual connecting account. Inspect share permissions, group nesting, explicit denies and inheritance on that object. A user may belong to another group carrying a Deny entry. Group scope, replication delay and stale logon tokens can explain a correct-looking ACL that does not yet work. Use the Effective Access tab as supporting evidence and retain a real network test.

When access is unexpectedly allowed, look for inherited grants, direct user entries, ownership and membership in other authorized groups. Membership in both read and modify groups normally accumulates allowed rights rather than making the result read-only. Access-based enumeration is a presentation feature and should never be used as proof that a user cannot open a known path. Remove the source of excessive permission rather than adding a competing Deny without understanding its wider effect.

Restore carefully and keep the model maintainable

If an ACL change breaks access, stop making additional changes and compare the affected path with the saved baseline. With the relative-path export shown earlier, restore from the same parent root after confirming the backup content and target: icacls D:\Shares /restore C:\AdminEvidence\Finance-acl.txt /c. Review errors and retest representative users. Do not restore an unrelated export or assume that restoring permissions recovers deleted data.

Keep resource groups tied to named owners and periodic access review. Remove a departing employee from the role group rather than searching for individual ACL entries across every share. Do not delete a resource group until its ACL use has been inventoried; deleting and recreating a group with the same name creates a different SID. Preserve change records and migrate permissions deliberately when a share moves to another domain or server.

Related guidance and official references

Create a secure SMB share; Run commands on multiple servers.


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